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I. INTRODUCTION
T he substantial decline in output, profits and employment in the
U.S. machine tool industry during a period marked both by a major
economic recession and by a substantial increase in imports affecting the
entire range of machine tools has focused intense interest on U.S.-Japa-
nese trade relations and the legal and political remedies available for ad-
dressing the domestic dislocation caused by competition from imports.
This article will examine the current state of U.S.-Japanese trade rela-
tions as it relates to the attempts by the domestic machine tool industry
to compete with increased Japanese imports.
Various relief mechanisms available to the machine tool industry
under existing trade laws, many of which are currently being utilized, will
be reviewed. In addition, a petition for relief under a previously unu-
tilized section of the Revenue Act of 19711 will be examined. The article
will review the nature of the argument presented by the petitioner,
Houdaille Industries, Inc., alleging that the Japanese government has fos-
tered the development of a cartel to promote its own machine tool indus-
try, and it will examine the statutory authority of the President to pro-
vide relief for the machine tool industry. Finally, the article will review
the various options available to the United States and its machine tool
industry in developing a solution to competition from imports.
* This article represents the position of the authors and does not reflect the policy of
the U.S. Department of Labor.
t Deputy Division Chief, Office of Trade Adjustment Assistance, U.S. Department of
Labor, Washington, D.C.; B.S., Georgetown University (1963).
tt Office of the Solicitor, U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, D.C.; B.A., Iona Col-
lege, New York (1970); M.A., New School for Social Research, New York (1973); J.D., New
York Law School, New York (1977).
1 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(7)(D) (1976).
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II. THE INDUSTRY AND THE THREAT
The U.S. machine tool industry, with shipments of some $5.68 billion
in 1982,2 is vital to every area of the U.S. industrial economy, from autos
to aerospace to home appliances. The industry is characterized by both a
high degree of concentration for the manufacture of the most sophisti-
cated equipment and by a high degree of competition3 with hundreds of
small firms located near the industries that they supply, indicating an
environment of competition and flexibility. However, the nature of the
industry also indicates that most firms in the industry may have trouble
adjusting to the latest technological innovations which have begun to
transform the machine tool industry. The adaptation of computer tech-
nology to the machine tool industry has transformed the industry from
merely the producer of simple one or two function machine tools into a
producer of sophisticated "computer numerically controlled" (CNC)
machining centers. New developments in the industry suggest that tre-
mendous growth will occur in the field of robotics, thereby taking the
CNC machine tool to a much higher level of development. Robots will
control or direct other machine tools in a whole range of production func-
tions, including sorting parts, assembly and final inspection. The amount
of capital that will be required to develop and produce the next genera-
tion of CNC machine tools and robots will exceed that available to all but
the largest firms.
As the industry is undergoing rapid technological change, imports
have become a major force in the domestic machine tool market. Imports
of metal cutting and forming machine tools grew from 6.6 percent of do-
mestic shipments in 1972 to 20.2 percent in 1979 and to 28.4 percent in
1982.' In the fastest growing segment of the machine tool industry, CNC
machining centers, imports have taken an even larger share of the domes-
tic market-35.5 percent in 1982.1 Japan is rapidly becoming the domi-
nant force in the expansion of imports. "In 1976 the Japanese . . .ac-
counted for only 3.7 percent of the U.S. market for NC machining
centers. By the first nine months of 1981, this market share had grown to
50.1 percent."' The result has been a series of petitions by the machine
2 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 1983, MACHINE TOOLS AND AccaS-
soRms 20-1, 20-2.
3 For example, the four largest firms account for 22 percent of metal cutting machine
tool shipments and 18 percent of metal forming machine tool shipments. In addition, over
66 percent of firms producing metal cutting machine tools and over 61 percent of firms
producing metal forming machine tools employ less than 20 persons. Id.
4 Id. at 20-2, 20-3.
5 Id. at 20-4.
6 Houdaille Industries, Inc., Petition to the President of the United States Through the
Office of the United States Trade Representative for the Exercise of Presidential Discretion
Authorized by Section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1971, at 2 (May 3, 1982). Imports reflected
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tool industry and its individual members requesting various forms of re-
lief from the increased competition from imports.7
III. REMEDY-LEGAL AND POLICAL
Since the end of World War II, the United States has been commit-
ted to the development of an open, anti-protectionist world trading sys-
tem. The goal has been to achieve the rapid growth of international trade
and the reconstruction of major industrial economies destroyed during
the war. The U.S. economy has, in the aggregate, benefited from free in-
ternational trade, particularly in such areas as aircraft production and
grain exportation; however, in other industries, such as shoe manufactur-
ing and watch manufacturing, international trade has caused severe dis-
ruptions. As a result, the Congress of the United States has established
various relief mechanisms to provide remedies for injuries which result
from imports. For the purpose of explication, these mechanisms can be
divided into two broad categories: (1) those that provide relief from in-
jury resulting from specific acts of foreign entities;8 and (2) those that
provide relief from injury which results from the volume of imports,
where such injury is serious9 or where the nature of the injury is serious
per se, as in cases where imports threaten to impair the national
security."0
The current state of the domestic machine tool industry, classified as
"severely depressed" by the National Machine Tool Builders Association,
is characterized by an 84 percent decline in net new orders from the first
quarter of 1979 to the last quarter of 1982, employment declines of pro-
duction workers by over 41,000 from April, 1980 to December, 1982, and
falling profits in 1981 and 1982.11 In addition, the industry experienced an
in terms of units.
7 See infra notes 39-42 and accompanying text (Petition by National Machine Tool
Builders' Association under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962); infra notes 43-47 and accom-
panying text (Petition by Cincinnati Miicron under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962); in-
ira notes 48-51 and accompanying text (Petition by Houdaille Industries under the Revenue
Act of 1971).
8 For example, antidumping duties may be imposed where injury is caused or
threatened by the sale of foreign merchandise in the United States at less than its fair value,
19 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. V 1981), or countervailing duties may be imposed where injury is
caused or threatened by imports which have been subsidized. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (Supp. V
1981).
9 19 U.S.C. § 2251 (1976).
10 Id. at § 1862.
1 National Machine Tool Builders' Association, Petition to the U.S. Department of
Commerce Under the National Security Clause, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962 (19 U.S.C. § 1862), for Adjustment of Imports of Machine Tools 106-114 (Mar. 10,
1983) [hereinafter cited as National Machine Tool].
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all-time low capacity utilization rate in January 1983.12
In order to qualify for protection under the various trade related
statutes, an industry must establish that imports are a causative factor of
the industry's injury. Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974,13 commonly
known as the "escape clause," provides that the U.S. International Trade
Commission (USITC), when requested, "shall promptly make an investi-
gation to determine whether an article is being imported into the United
States in such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious
injury, or the threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an arti-
cle like or directly competitive with the imported article."'14 The machine
tool industry has not currently filed a petition under section 201 of the
Trade Act of 1974. However, a previous determination involving the U.S.
automobile industry is instructive in examining the level of injury re-
quired for a favorable finding by the USITC. 15 The USITC conducted an
investigation pursuant to receipt of a petition for import relief filed by
the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultrual
Implement Workers of America (UAW) on June 12, 1980, and it issued its
determination on December 3, 1980.16 Data compiled by the USITC dur-
ing its investigation revealed that the ratio of imported passenger cars to
domestic consumption increased from 25.1 percent in 1978 to 35.8 percent
in the first six months of 1980.17 Domestic car shipments decreased from
1978 to 1979.18 In the first six months of 1980, domestic shipments fell by
over two million automobiles, 19 while imports continued to rise both in
absolute terms and as a percentage of total U.S. auto consumption. 0 In
its determination, issued under section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, the
Commissioners were not required to determine the nature or source of
the injury.21 Thus, even though Japan was the major exporter to the U.S.
market and increased its share of imports from 13.0 percent of domestic
consumption in 1978 to 22.5 percent in the first six months of 1980,22 the
USITC looked to the aggregate level of imports in making its determina-
tion on the two basic elements of the "escape clause" provision.
12 Id.
23 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b) (1976).
14 Id.
1 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMSSION, REORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON INVESTIGATION No. TA-
201-44, CERTAIN MOTOR VEHICLES AND CERTAIN CHASIS AND BODIES THEREFOR, U.S.I.T.C.
Pub. No. 1110 (Dec. 3, 1980)[hereinafter cited as INVESTIGATIONS].
16 Id.
17 Id. at A-48.
18 Id.
19 Id. at A-43.
20 Id. at 169.
21 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b) (1976).
" INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 15, at A-23.
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The first element to be determined is serious injury. "Section
201(b)(2) of the Trade Act requires that the Commission shall take into
account all economic factors which it considers relevant, including (but
not limited to) . . . the significant idling of productive facilities in the
industry, the inability of a significant number of firms to operate at a
reasonable level of profit, and significant unemployment . *.. 2 3 The
Commissioners were in general agreement that this first element had
been satisfied and that injury had occurred to the domestic automobile
industry.24 As for the second element, the Trade Act defines "substantial
cause" as a cause which is important and not less than any other cause.25
Commissioner Calhoun, in examining the changes in this causality stan-
dard as written into the Trade Act of 1974, determined that the commit-
tee reports clearly indicated a desire to create a more liberal test of injury
by replacing "major cause" with "substantial cause. '26 However, a major-
ity of the Commissioners, including Commissioner Calhoun, rejected the
petition, relying on an aggregation of factors such as high interest rates,
high gasoline prices and high unemployment, rather than imports, in or-
der to explain the cause of the injury. In the words of Commissioner
Alberger:
I do not find that increased imports are a substantial cause of such injury
.... I have found the decline in demand for new automobiles and light
trucks owing to the general recessionary conditions in the United States
economy to be a far greater cause of the domestic industries' plight than
the increase in imports.27
Commissioners Bedell and Moore dissented, concluding that all con-
ditions for an affirmative finding had been met. These two Commissioners
explained that section 201 required the USITC to weigh each factor indi-
vidually in making a determination of injury.2 8 The recession should be
viewed in terms of the component elements creating the economic de-
cline. The dissenters reported:
As the legislative history of section 201 suggests, it is not feasible to as-
sign a number on a scale of 1 to 10 to each of the causes of serious injury
and thereby discover which is the most important cause. On the other
hand, it is consistent with the legislative intent to examine each individ-
ual cause to determine which one, if absent, would have had the greatest
effect of alleviating the serious injury experienced by the domestic indus-
try. On that basis the most important cause of serious injury to the do-
23 Id. at 16.
24 Id. at 34-36, 92, 119, 169-75.
25 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(4) (1976).
26 INVESTIGATIONS, supra note 15, at 67.
27 Id. at 21.
' Id. at 172-73.
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mestic automobile industry is increasing imports of on-the-highway pas-
senger automobiles. 9
Thus, for the automobile industry, the legal questions of whether import
relief could be provided under section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 was
resolved with the USITC's negative determination on December 3, 1980.30
However, a political remedy was forthcoming on April 1, 1981 when,
after discussions with the U.S. government, the Japanese government un-
dertook a "voluntary restraint program" whereby a quota on exports of
automobiles to the U.S. market was established." As domestic automo-
bile production continued to fall in 1981 and 1982,32 the Japanese govern-
ment maintained the quota at the same level through March 31, 1984.ss
On November 1, 1983, the government of Japan announced that it would
undertake an additional twelve months of a "voluntary restraint pro-
gram" on automobile exports to the United States but at a level slightly
more than ten percent higher than the quota established for the previous
three years.3 4
An alternative method of addressing the problem, one which has sig-
nificant ramifications, is currently being pursued through legislative chan-
nels in the form of "domestic content" legislation.3 5 The intent of this
29 Id at 177.
30 See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
31 N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1983, at Dl; Washington Post, Nov. 2, 1983, at D7. See generally
Waller, Redefining the Foreign Compulsion Defense in U.S. Antitrust Law: The Japanese
Auto Restraints and Beyond, 14 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 747-817 (1982).
32 The production level in 1982 of just over five million was the lowest since 1958. 1983
WARD's AuToMoTIvE YEARBOOK 80-81.
33 See supra note 31. A resolution was introduced in the U.S. Senate on Oct. 27, 1983
whereby it would be resolved with the concurrence of the House of Representatives:
That it is the sense of the Congress that in order to reduce high unemployment in
the United States automobile industry, to foster the recovery of United States
automobile production, and to avoid the United States trade situation from fur-
ther deteriorating, the President and his representatives should urge the Japanese
to extend the voluntary automobile export limits beyond March 31, 1984, at the
present level without any exceptions.
S. Con. Res. 81, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (the resolution was referred to the Senate Com-
mittee on Finance and no action has been reported through Jan. 17, 1984).
" See supra note 31. The Japanese announcement coincided with scheduled considera-
tion by the House of Representatives of H.R. 1234, the "domestic content" bill, see infra
note 35. The House Trade Subcommittee staff director noted that the announcement defi-
nitely helps the opponents of the bill which "[w]e now have a very good chance of beating."
N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1983, at D2.
11 H.R. 1234, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (passed the House of Respresentatives on
Nov. 3, 1983; received in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science
and Transportation on Nov. 7, 1983). It was reported that H.R. 1234 is unlikely to pass the
Senate, and that, if it does, the President would likely veto it. N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1983, at
Al.
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legislation is to require foreign producers of automobiles to produce
automobiles with a certain percentage of U.S. content in order to sell to
the U.S. market.
3 6
Perhaps in light of the adverse determination by the USITC in the
case of the automobile industry, the machine tool industry and its mem-
bers have chosen not to seek relief under section 201 of the Trade Act of
1974 in seeking a legal remedy for the impact of imports. Even if the
machine tool industry had petitioned under section 201 and even if the
USITC had found injury, it still remains for the President to "determine
what method and amount of import relief he will provide, or determine
that the provision of such relief is not in the national economic interest of
the United States. '3
7
The National Machine Tool Builders Association (NMTBA) and its
members have chosen to pursue legal channels with specific detailed rem-
edies. First, the NMTBA in March, 1983 filed a petition3 8 with the De-
partment of Commerce under the National Security Clause of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962.39 The petition states:4 0
[Relief is sought] in the form of quotas upon metal-cutting and metal-
forming machine tools imported into the United States. More specifi-
cally, NMTBA requests a five-year regime of quotas limiting imports in
each of the two broad sectors of machine tools, as follows:
Annual Limit on Imports
(Percentage of Total
Domestic Consumption by
Sector Value)
Metal-Cutting Machine Tools 17.5%
Metal-Forming Machine Tools 17.5%
The NMTBA filed the petition on the basis of the machine tool in-
dustry's critical role in U.S. industry and its indispensability both in pre-
paring for war and during wartime conditions. They argued that:
In light of the unique showing required to establish a basis for relief
under the National Security Clause, it is appropriate to set forth, at the
outset, precisely what [the] NMTBA is required to show, and what it is
not required to show, to qualify for such relief. The Clause reads in
36 Id.
37 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1) (1976). "Out of 48 section 201 cases completed since 1974,
only 11 have resulted in import relief and in only one of those has the President approved
what the International Trade Commission recommended." 129 CONG. REC. S16965 (daily ed.
Nov. 18, 1983).
" National Machine Tool, supra note 11.
39 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1976).
40 See National Machine Tool, supra note 11, at 1-2.
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terms of impairment, not destruction, of the national security. Moreover,
it is unnecessary to show that imports will certainly impair the national
security; instead, a threat of such impairment is sufficient. Finally, Con-
gress has not required that [the] NMTBA show that imports caused the
present depression of the United States machine tool industry. Instead,
the Clause requires only a determination that, in the circumstances of
that depression and its aftermath, imports of foreign-made machine tools
threaten to impair the national security.41
The NMTBA argues that if the role of the machine tool industry is
accepted as a critical one in terms of national security and if the level of
imports in light of economic conditions and the state of the industry
threatens that role, then a remedy should be provided. Therefore, the
NMTBA claims there is no necessity of establishing the degree of injury
due to import penetration. Rather, a sufficiently depressed domestic mar-
ket may be vulnerable to almost any level of imports.
However, in pursuing a remedy under the National Security Clause
and requesting quotas for machine tools significantly below the current
level of imports, the NMTBA went beyond the issue of National Security
and addressed the viability of the domestic industry and the existence of
specific import challenges. They stated that "[iut is clear ... that imports
of machine tools are threatening the domestic industry's ability and in-
centive to preserve and expand its production base and to continue its
leadership in high technology research and development.
42
In developing the argument of present and continuing injury to the
domestic machine tool industry from imports, the NMTBA utilized a
study on the competitiveness of the domestic machine tool industry
which was used as a petition to the USITC by one of its members, Cin-
cinnati Miicron.4s In Computer-Aided Manufacturing: The Japanese
Challenge,44 Cincinnati Milicron presented its case against the Japanese
threat to the high-technology growth sector of the machine tool industry.
Cincinnati Milicron argued that the U.S. industry has been damaged by
imports, citing association data that 97 percent of all imported Japanese
machining centers were sophisticated NC machining centers45 and that
imported Japanese NC machining centers grew from 2 percent of the
41 Id. at 60.
43 Id. at 10.
43 This investigation was self-initiated by the ITC under section 332 of the Tariff Act of
1930. It will issue its findings on the international competitiveness of the U.S. machine tool
industry but will issue no recommendation. 19 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
44 Cincinnati Milacron, Computer-Aided Manufacturing- The Japanese Challenge,
Comments Submitted to the U.S. Int'l Trade Commission in Investigation No. 332-149
(Dec. 14, 1982).
41 Id. Appendix 5 at 16.
Vol. 15:469
INDUSTRIAL TARGETING PRACTICES
market in 1979 to 53 percent of the market in 1981.46 Further, it argued
that this injury has resulted in part by direct actions of the Japanese
government in assisting its machine tool industry, and that the govern-
ment assistance, according to Cincinnati Milicron, has resulted in the
Japanese gaining a larger share of the world market for machine tools
than if the industry had been operating without such assistance.
"Spurred on by their Government, the Japanese manufacturers of com-
puter controlled robots and machine tools are already swamping the mar-
kets in this country and.., have captured more than half of the market
that exists in the United States for technologically sophisticated com-
puter-aided manufacturing equipment." 7 Thus, it was argued that injury
results from a high level of imports into the recessionary U.S. economy, as
well as from direct actions of the Japanese government as the result of its
policies to strengthen and develop its own machine tool industry.
The scope of the request for import relief of Cincinnati Milicron was
further expanded by Houdaille Industries, Inc. when it presented its peti-
tion48 to the President on May 3, 1982, asking for legal redress under
section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1971.4 9 Under section 103, the Presi-
dent may suspend the 10 percent investment tax credit on products from
a foreign country upon a determination that the foreign country engages
in unfair trade practices.50 The action by Houdaille was based on the con-
tention that more has occurred than merely import injury to the domestic
industry, and that more than casual government assistance has been pro-
vided to the Japanese machine tool industry. Houdaille argued that it
"has uncovered conclusive evidence that the Japanese government insti-
gated the formation of... [a] cartel and continues to shield its members
from competition." 51 Section 103 of the Revenue Act has not previously
been utilized to restrain imports. The Houdaille petition fills two volumes
with 600 pages of text, tables, graphs and original source documents in
both Japanese and English.
The petition addresses the methods that the Japanese government
and its Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) have uti-
lized to target the Japanese machine tool industry as a high growth and
export industry. Houdaille maintains that the laws passed by the Japa-
nese government have had the result of shielding the industry from anti-
monopoly scrutiny in the areas of rationalization and concentration of
46 Id. Appendix 5 at 17.
47 Id. at 2.
48 See Houdaille Industries, Inc., supra note 6.
4 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(7)(D) (1976).
10 Id.
51 Houdaille Industries, Inc., supra note 6, at 1-2.
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production, price agreements and government subsidies.52 In its initial
support of machine tool industry development, MITI was able to
strengthen the market position of firms in the industry under its guide-
lines which provide that any firm "whose production of a particular ma-
chine tool was less than 5 percent of the Japanese market in that tool and
less than 20 percent of the company's total production was directed to
stop manufacturing these tools."5 3 Further evidence of the Japanese gov-
ernment's active development of a cartel to assist in targeting the ma-
chine tool industry for growth are concessionary loans and subsidies.
These subsidies in the form of "[m]illions of dollars worth of yen gener-
ated by wagering on bicycle and motorcycle races in Japan were funnelled
into export industries, including the machine-tool cartel.""
The actions by the Japanese government were not a recent phenome-
non, but have evolved over a period of three decades, beginning in 1956,
when the first of a series of laws were implemented to assist the machine
tool industry. These laws, known as the First, Second and Third Ex-
traordinary Measures Laws,55 were intended to establish "the groundwork
for concentrating and promoting the Japanese machinery industry."56
The Second Extraordinary Measure was "aimed at promoting certain des-
ignated machinery industries by improving 'production techniques and
rationalization of production'.. . [and] contained a specific commitment
of financial assistance. '57 The Third Extraordinary Measure, which is due
to expire in 1985, "entrusts MITI with establishing an 'Elevation Plan'
for enterprises that manufacture certain machines grouped in three sub-
categories. Cabinet Order No. 342 of September 29, 1978, has specified
that each of these three subcategories includes [n]umerically controlled
metal cutting machine tools." 58 The effect has been to allow the Japanese
machine tool industry to develop without the constraints of monopoly
and antitrust law.5 9
IV. THE SCOPE OF PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 103
The Houdaille Petition was submitted to the President through the
Office of the United States Trade Representative, which then referred it
52 Id. at 4-9.
53 Id. at 4.
5 Id. at 7.
5 Id. at 55.
5Id.
57 Id. at 77.
" Id. at 81-82.
59 See also REPORT BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT EcO-
NOMIC COMMITTEE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, INDUSTRIAL POLICY: JAPAN'S FLEXIBLE AP-
PROACH, GAO/ID-82-32, at 50 (June 23, 1982).
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to an interagency task force for analysis.60 The task force received written
comments opposing the petition from Japanese trade associations.,,
Among other things, the task force considered whether section 103 of the
Revenue Act of 1971 authorizes the President to act only in response to
foreign import restrictions which affect the export trade of the United
States.6 2 The following analysis concludes that such a restrictive interpre-
tation of section 103 does not reflect Congressional intent and finds that
the President has the authority to grant the relief sought by Houdaille
Industries.
Section 103 provides that if the President determines that a foreign
country either: "(i) maintains nontariff trade restrictions, including varia-
ble import fees, which substantially burden United States commerce in a
manner inconsistent with provisions of trade agreements, or (ii) engages
in discriminatory or other acts (including tolerance of international car-
tels) or policies unjustifiably restricting United States commerce," he may
provide by Executive Order that the products of such foreign country are
ineligible for the investment tax credit.6 3 In order to assess the merit of
the contention that section 103 does not provide authority for the Presi-
dent to suspend the investment tax credit in response to actions or poli-
cies of a foreign government or instrumentality which unjustifiably re-
strict the domestic economy of the United States, it is necessary to
consider the extent of Presidential authority as it existed under section
252(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962."
0 In processing the Houdaille Petition, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
apparently adopted the procedures established for petitions under section 301 of the Trade
Act of 1974, as amended 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1976), and the regulations pertaining thereto. 15
C.F.R. §§ 2006.0-2006.15 (1982).
61 Japan Machine Tool Builders' Association, Japan Metal Forming Machine Builders'
Association, and Japan Machinery Exporters' Association, Comments in Opposition to the
Houdaille Petition (July 29, 1982, Aug. 31, 1982).
e2 26 U.S.C. § 48(a)(7)(D) (1976).
63 Id.
" The extent of Presidential authority under section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1971 is
the same as that which existed under section 252(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,
Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 879 (1962), replaced by section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as
amended 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1976), because (1) language describing the acts or policies for
which sanctions may be imposed under section 103 was drawn verbatim from section 252(b);
and (2) the Conference Report concerning the Revenue Act of 1971 explicitly states "[t]he
trade restrictions are the same as those contained in section 252(b) of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962." CONF. REP. No. 178, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2055-56.
Section 252(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 879
(1962), provides:
(b) Whenever a foreign country or instrumentality the products of which re-
ceive benefits of trade agreement concessions made by the United States-
(1) maintains nontariff trade restrictions, including variable import fees,
1983
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It is a settled matter of our law and practice that a statutory term is
to be understood by the plain and obvious meaning of the words em-
ployed.6 5 To argue that the President was authorized to respond, under
section 252(b), only to acts or policies unjustifiably restricting the foreign
trade of the United States, one must interpret the term "United States
commerce" in a manner unwarranted not only by the provision's plain
meaning but also by reference to the Constitution and laws of the United
States. The Constitution clearly divides the power of Congress to regulate
commerce into categories which include both foreign and domestic
trade.6 When Congress, without expressed or implied qualification, dele-
gates authority to the President to act regarding the commerce of the
United States, such authority should be interpreted to extend to both
foreign and domestic aspects of U.S. commerce.
In other provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Congress
differentiated between domestic and foreign commerce. Under section
201, for example, the President is authorized to enter into trade agree-
ments when he determines that any existing duties or other import re-
strictions are "unduly burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the
United States." s More importantly, Congress indicated in section 102(1)
that one purpose of the Act was "to stimulate the economic growth of the
United States and maintain and enlarge foreign markets for the products
of United States agriculture, industry, mining and commerce."68 The
foregoing provisions make it quite plain that Congress intended the
Trade Expansion Act to apply to all aspects of U.S. commerce, and that a
distinction between foreign and domestic markets be made whenever it
was intended to limit the application of a particular section of the Act to
a segment of U.S. commerce.
The plain and natural meaning of the statutory language of section
252(b) does not support a construction of Presidential authority which is
limited only to foreign acts or policies restricting U.S. exports. Moreover,
the heading of section 252, "Foreign Import Restrictions," cannot be con-
which substantially burden United States commerce in a manner inconsistent
with provisions of trade agreements, or
(2) engages in discriminatory or other acts (including tolerance of interna-
tional cartel(s) or policies unjustifiably restricting United States commerce), the
President shall, to the extent that such action is consistent with the purposes of
section 102-
(A) suspend, withdraw, or prevent the application of benefits of trade agree-
ment concessions to products of such country or instrumentality, or
(B) refrain from proclaiming benefits of trade agreement concessions to carry
out a trade agreement with such country or instrumentality.
" Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202 (1819).
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
67 19 U.S.C. § 1821(a) (1976).
" Id. § 1801(1) (emphasis added).
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strued to qualify the acts or policies mentioned in section 252(b) since, in
the absence of textual ambiguity, "the title of a statute and the heading
of a section cannot limit the plain meaning of the text."69 The restrictive
interpretation of section 252(b) is further undermined by the fact that
section 252(c) applies to situations where the unreasonable import restric-
tions of one foreign country divert the exports of another country into the
domestic market of the United States and thereby create a substantial
burden on U.S. commerce. As Senator Bush stated in floor debate:
This committee amendment [Section 252(c)] authorizes, but does not re-
quire, the President to suspend past concessions, and to refrain from
granting new concessions to countries whose import restrictions burden
our commerce. The provision is worded so that the failure of another
country to extend the benefit of its concessions on a most-favored-nation
basis to Japan and other low-wage countries would permit the President
to act against that country, since its failure would force Japan's exports
unnaturally into the United States.7 0
An expansive interpretation of Presidential authority under section
252(b) is further supported by reference to an earlier version of that sec-
tion. The section-by-section analysis of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962
as submitted to Congress by the Executive Branch elaborates upon the
Administration's version of section 252(b) in the following manner:
Section 242. Suspension of Benefits.
This section is substantially identical to the proviso of section
350(a)(5) of the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, as amended [Tariff Act
of 1930]. It provides that the President shall, when he determines that
the purposes of the act will be promoted thereby, suspend the reduction
or elimination of any duty or other import restriction provided in any
proclamation issued in carrying out any trade agreement under Title II
or any prior trade agreements act, to products of any foreign country
which (1) engages in discriminatory treatment of U.S. commerce or (2)
engages in other acts, including the operation of international cartels, or
policies which in the President's opinion tend to defeat such purposes.7'
The United States Tariff Commission (now known as the USITC), also
submitted an analysis of H.R. 9900 and noted, in discussing section 242,
that: "This provision is derived from the proviso to existing section
" Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 528, 529 (1947).
70 108 CONG. REc. 19,825 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Bush), reprinted in HousE COM. ON
WAYS AND MEANS, 90TH CONG., IST SESs., 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TRADE EXPANSION
AcT OF 1962, at 1764-65 (1967).
7' Section-by-section analysis as prepared by the Executive Branch to accompany H.R.
9900, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TRADE EXPAN-
SION AcT OF 1962, at 118 (1967).
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350(a)(5) of the Tariff Act. '7 2 Both the section-by-section analysis and
the Tariff Commission memorandum state that the President shall take
action against the act(s) or policies of a foreign country which, in his
opinion, defeat the purposes of the act. One purpose of the act is to stim-
ulate the domestic economic growth of the United States."
Contrasting Presidential authority under section 252(b) with such
authority as it existed under the predecessor statute 4 provides further
support for a broad interpretation of section 252(b). An examination of
section 350(a)(5) of the Tariff Act of 19307 reveals that the language of
the proviso is substantially similar to draft section 242 as proposed by the
Administration, 6 as well as to section 252(b) as enacted.7 7 However, there
is a critical difference which demonstrates the enlargement of Presiden-
tial authority under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
Section 350(a)(1) of the Tariff Act of 1930 authorizes the President,
"[f]or the purpose of expanding foreign markets for the products of the
United States," to proclaim appropriate modifications of duties and other
import restrictions in order to carry out authorized trade agreements."
Section 350(a)(5) provided that such proclaimed modifications were to
apply to the articles of all foreign countries subject, inter alia, to the fol-
lowing proviso:
That the President shall, as soon as practicable, suspend the application
[of modifications] to articles the growth, produce, or manufacture of any
country because of its discriminatory treatment of American commerce
or because of other acts (including the operations of international car-
tels) or policies which in his opinion tend to defeat the purpose of this
section.79
It is clear that by this language Congress directed the President to sus-
pend proclaimed benefits regarding the products of a foreign country
whenever, in his opinion, the acts or policies of such country prevented
the expansion of foreign markets for products of the United States.
In determining whether the President's authority under section
252(b) of the Trade Expansion Act extended to both foreign and domes-
tic commerce, it is clear that the predecessor statute was limited in pur-
712 U.S. TARIFF COMM'N, MEMORANDUM ON H.R. 9900 OF THE 87TH CONG., THE TRADE
EXPANSION AcT OF 1962, at 20 (Apr. 9, 1962), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
TRADE EXPANSION AcT OF 1962, at 750 (1967).
73 19 U.S.C. § 1801 (1976).
7' Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, 46 Stat. 590, 672 (1930).
76 Id.
76 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TRADE EXPANSION AcT oF 1962, at 98, 118 (1976).
7 Pub. L. No. 87-794, 77 Stat. 879 (1962); supra note 64.
78 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a)(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
71 Pub. L. No. 86, 69 Stat. 162, 164 (1955) (emphasis added).
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pose to expanding foreign markets, while the raison d'9tre of the Trade
Expansion Act was deliberately broadened to include the purpose of ex-
panding the domestic economy of the United States.80 If promoting do-
mestic economic growth was not a purpose of the Trade Expansion Act,
the argument that Presidential authority under section 252(b) was re-
stricted to foreign trade would have more force. The existence of that
purpose confirms that section 252(b) should be construed according to
the plain and natural meaning of its terms, and that the President was
authorized thereunder to take action against foreign acts or policies un-
justifiably restricting the domestic or foreign commerce of the United
States.
This conclusion is supported by reference to a decision of the United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals which was rendered prior to
the enactment of the Trade Expansion Act. In Star-Kist Foods v. United
States,81 the court compared the powers delegated to the President under
section 350(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 with the powers delegated under
earlier tariff acts.8 2 According to the court, both the scope and constitu-
tionality of such delelgations of authority are determined by the existence
of a stated Congressional purpose in furtherance of which Presidential
action may be invoked, and by the existence of a standard sufficient to
indicate when action by the President is appropriate.83
The court in Star-Kist clearly defined the extent of Presidential au-
thority under the proviso of section 350(a)(5) in terms of the stated Con-
gressional purpose of promoting the foreign trade of the United States.84
If the reasoning of the court is applied to the issue of Presidential author-
ity under section 252(b) of the Trade Expansion Act, the conclusion is
inescapable that the President thereby possessed authority to act regard-
ing both domestic and foreign commerce.
When unfair trade practices were mentioned during floor debates
concerning section 252 of the Trade Expansion Act, the reference was
usually to foreign acts or policies that restricted U.S. exports. 85 However,
unfair trade practices were not exclusively related to U.S. exports during
the floor debates.86 Furthermore, even though there is no statement in the
80 Section 102(1) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872
(1962) (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1801(1) (1976)).
82 275 F.2d 472 (C.C.P.A. 1959).
82 Id. at 480-481.
9 Id. at 480.
Id. at 480-482.
Supra note 70.
8 Id. Additionally, in the Senate floor debate both on the House bill and Conference
Report, section 252 was discussed as providing a remedy for domestic injury to the U.S.
lumber industry which had the effect of increasing exports to the United States. See gener-
ally the discussions concerning potential remedies under the act for Canadian lumber subsi-
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debates which establishes the extent of Presidential authority to take ac-
tion in response to a restriction of the domestic economy pursuant to the
Revenue Act or to the Trade Expansion Act, the U.S. Senate recently
agreed in a Senate resolution that the President has, and should exercise,
authority under section 103 of the Revenue Act of 1971 to grant the relief
requested by Houdaille Industries.8s
dies which invariably included reference to section 252(b). 108 CONG. REc. 19,807-12, 22,181-
88 (1962), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 1962, at
1731-38, 2026-37 (1967). See also the debate regarding a proposed amendment to section
252(b), the purpose of which was to authorize the President to use the trade power given
him under the bill for the purpose of conserving fishery resources. According to Senator
Bartlett:
The approach employed by the amendment is direct. It amends section 252(b) of
the bill by adding two conditions under which the President may suspend trade
concessions granted other nations. The amendment would permit the President
after public hearing and within his own discretion to withhold trade concessions if
he determines that a country is engaged in practices which tend to defeat our
efforts to conserve fishery resources or if he determines a country is taking any
action contrary to the principles of international law to harass U.S. fishing vessels
on the high seas .... [W]e pointed out that the amendment is consistent with the
purposes of the bill .... We stated that the amendment is consistent also with the
organizational structure provided by the bill, in which wide discretion is given the
President to solve these complex and interrelated problems. A broad range of eco-
nomic responses must be available to the President, so he can tailor the remedy to
meet situations involving any particular country at any time in the future.
108 CONG. REc. 19,782-83 (1962), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE TRADE EXPAN-
SION AcT o' 1962, at 1690-91 (1967).
87 S. Res. 525, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REc. S15,962 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1982).
The text of Senate Resolution 525 is as follows:
Whereas the Government of Japan has selected the United States high-tech-
nology industry in numerically-controlled machine tools for domination through
unfair trade practices; and
Whereas the Petition to the President submitted by Houdaille Industries,
Inc., on May 2, 1982, thoroughly documents continuing anticompetitive cartel pol-
icies and practices, including the financing of a machine-tool cartel with multi-
billion dollar off-budget subsidies earned from bicycle and motorcycle-race wager-
ing, employed by the Government of Japan to further its industry-targeting goals;
and
Whereas as a consequence of the discriminatory acts and policies of the Gov-
ernment of Japan, including its tolerance of an international machine-tool cartel,
the Government of Japan has unjustifiably restricted United States commerce in
numerically-controlled machining centers and punching machines: Now therefore,
be it resolved.
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President of the United
States should exercise immediately his authority under Section 103 of the Reve-
nue Act of 1971, 26 U.S.C. 48(a)(7)(D), to issue an Executive Order disqualifying
Japanese-manufactured, numerically-controlled machining centers and punching
machines from the United States investment tax credit until the Government of
Japan provides persuasive evidence to the President of the United States that
these and other unfair and discriminatory acts and policies unjustifiably restrict-
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In a case involving the extent of congressionally delegated authority
where the legislative history was contradictory, the Supreme Court has
stated: "Because of this ambiguity it is clear that we must look primarily
to the statutes themselves to find the legislative intent."8 8 The legislative
histories regarding the extent of authority delegated to the President
under section 252(b) of the Trade Expansion Act and section 103 of the
Revenue Act are not ambiguous because they are contradictory, but be-
cause they are non-existent. Under such circumstances, the scope of Pres-
idential authority is to be determined by the statutory language itself.
Neither the plain language of the Trade Expansion Act nor the Revenue
Act nor the legislative antecedents of sections 103 and 252(b) warrant an
interpretation which limits Presidential authority only to foreign acts or
policies restricting U.S. exports.8 9
V. PROSPECTS AND POLICY OPTIONS
The United States and Japan are two powerful economic entities
that are allies as well as major trading partners. While both economies
operate on the basis of a free market system, there is a basic difference in
the philosophic outlook that provides the framework for the respective
economies. The U.S. economy has operated on a laissez-faire system
under which firms compete in the open market for access to capital and
customers. Firms which feel they have been denied free access to the
market can petition the government for redress.
On the other hand, the Japanese government has carefully planned,
nurtured and guided major segments of its economy as a result of the
scarcity of many raw materials and the devastation of its industrial econ-
omy during the Second World War. The Japanese government has insti-
tuted policies which have encouraged or assisted its domestic industries
in selling to a world-wide market, thus causing problems not only in the
United States, but in other industrial countries as well. The resulting dis-
ruption to major U.S. industries in such areas as automobiles, steel and
machine tools has challenged the validity of basic tenets of our economic
system. The following assumptions may no longer be valid: (1) that the
size and versatility of the U.S. economy would shield it from any competi-
tion from imports; (2) that domestic manufacturers could concentrate al-
most exclusively on the domestic market while the export market re-
ing United States commerce have ceased.
" Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412 n.29 (1971).
"' After "eleven months of intense and often acrimonious debate" at the sub-cabinet
and Cabinet level, a set of "agreed facts" was prepared which "supported much of the
Houdaille legal complaint." The issue was submitted to the President who, on April 22,
1983, determined not to exercise his discretionary authority to grant the relief sought by
Houdaille Industries. Washington Post, Aug. 15, 1983, at Al, A4.
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mained a secondary consideration; and, (3) that the development and
marketing of the most sophisticated, capital intensive products can be ac-
complished without any cooperation among firms, or direct involvement
by the government.
The options available for facing the competition from imports appear
to be threefold. The first option is to take no action at all and allow the
market to allocate the production and consumption freely without gov-
ernmental interference. This would appear to be politically unacceptable
since it fails to address the severe dislocations affecting major segments of
the U.S. economy which are most affected by imports. The second option
is to continue the attempt to find relief through the pursuit of legal action
such as the petitions outlined under the Trade Act of 1974 or the Reve-
nue Act of 1971.90 These remedies would restrain, curb or moderate the
inflow of imports for a given period of time. However, the remedies do
nothing to encourage the development of new markets, to assist in the
improvement of old products or to facilitate the introduction of new ones.
The third option is for management, labor and government in the United
States to recognize that profound changes are occurring in the global
market place which are directly affecting the U.S. economy. The magni-
tude of these changes is far more drastic than those that have occurred in
the recent past, and it must be recognized that there is currently no
mechanism in the United States that is capable of responding to these
changes.
While U.S. military policy attempts to anticipate and provide for
every possible strategic threat, U.S. economic policy continues to operate
on the premise that the industrial sector of the U.S. economy will self-
adjust to any threat which it faces. The fact is that the U.S. economy is
maturing; the exponential growth of high paying jobs which were gener-
ated during the past decades will not continue. At the same time the de-
velopment of a sophisticated high growth industrial policy by the Japa-
nese has increased competition for markets both in the United States and
worldwide.
Therefore, a long range solution to the import threat and to the
changing U.S. economy requires a different approach from the current
dispersion of trade authority throughout a myriad of government agencies
and interagency councils. What may be required is the formation of a new
department similar to Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Indus-
try (MITI). This department would monitor and encourage the develop-
ment of capital intensive, high technology, high growth industries and ex-
See supra notes 16-30 and accompanying text (UAW petition under the Trade Act of
1974); supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (Houdaille Industries' petition under the
Revenue Act of 1971).
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amine the various needs of older industries in adapting to import
competition and changing technology.

